Ukrainian soldiers near Severodonetsk - Photographer Johanna-Maria Fritz
U.S. President Joe Biden gave a speech on a cold February evening in Poland's capital, Warsaw, promising, "Ukraine will never be a Russian victory - never." We see this rhetoric passing daily in the media since the outbreak of war. The prevailing Western narrative is the Russians are waging an ill-prepared war, with an incompetent military leadership, an army that primarily uses old equipment and soldiers sent to their deaths according to a Stalinist "human waves" doctrine. According to the British Ministry of Defense, Russian soldiers are even sent into battle armed with only shovels. This is countered by the image of hugely motivated and well-trained Ukrainians. They receive "superior" western weapons and appear to be successfully integrating various new forms of technology into their strategy.
The Ukrainians have certainly shown that they are motivated. In addition, without the Western weapons and NATO training they have received since 2014, they would not be able to sustain the fight for so long. However, the fight for the Ukrainians is proving to be a bloody one with no prospect. The West has already sent many "game changers" to Kiev in the past year. HIMARS, M777 howitzers, kamikaze drones, Javelins, NLAWs and harpoon missiles. In addition to weapons, tens of thousands of western mercenaries came to Ukraine's aid. Nevertheless, Ukraine has not succeeded in defeating Russia. Nor will it, because the Russians have changed the game on the battlefield.
As the Russian tanks rolled toward Kiev and other parts of Ukraine during the first weeks of the war, Putin’s intention was to overthrow Zelensky's government in favor of a Moscow-friendly leader. Putin hoped to end the war quickly in his favor, with as few casualties on either side as possible. Putin's rhetoric was therefore built on the discourse of a special military operation, rather than an all-or-nothing war. Putin is a politician, a chess player, as many describe him, and sought a quick deposition of government Zelensky.
Wars are won by generals and not politicians, history has often shown us. Putin's opening move turned out to be completely different than he had hoped for. Not only did the Ukrainians continue to resist, troops on the Ukrainian side turned out to be many times larger. The Russians invaded Ukraine with 150,000 troops, while Ukraine had a force of no less than 250,000 troops. As an invading force, although the Russians had the initiative, they did not have numerical superiority. The Russian strategy of driving columns of tanks and other military equipment towards major Ukrainian cities did not work out well. The Russian troops who penetrated deep in Ukrainian territory proved vulnerable. Ukrainian troops were able to move freely behind the Russian lines and lay ambushes along the roads, resulting in an untenable situation for the Russians.
That the Russian army leadership was incompetent, as is often claimed in Western media, is a misrepresentation. The army leadership showed that they could fix Putin's political gamble by quickly stabilizing the situation on the battlefield. They made the right decision by withdrawing from parts of Ukraine, shortening the fronts. In addition, they restored the balance on the battlefield by mobilizing 300,000 reservists against the now 1 million Ukrainian soldiers. Still, the Ukrainians retained numerical superiority, but for the Russian military leadership it was enough to counterbalance the increasing Ukrainian offensives. Since the Russian mobilization, it has been abundantly clear that the Ukrainians have been pushed to the defensive.
After stabilizing the front and mobilizing reservists, the media created an expectation of a major Russian winter offensive. However, Russia used a different strategy, much less spectacular, but very effective. The strategy of slowly dismantling Ukraine's military potential with the least possible risk to its own military. The Russians have no numerical superiority in terms of troops at the front, but they do have a numerical superiority in artillery. Not only do the Russians have 10 times more artillery pieces than the Ukrainians, but, according to European Commission figures, they fire 50,000 shells a day, while the Ukrainians fire only 6,000 shells. Against such a rain of steel, the Ukrainians are defenseless. Unable to implement their NATO training, Ukrainian soldiers must crawl away into trenches, where they are decimated by Russian artillery.
With the effective use of their artillery, large risky offensives are not at all necessary for a Russian victory. In fact, Kiev is playing into the Russians' hands with their current strategy. Stalin once came up with the order "not a step back," but it seems Zelensky believes in the same doctrine. Zelensky, who seems to consider a well-oiled PR machine more important than strategic military decisions, continues to cling desperately to cities in the Donbass such as Severodonetsk and Bakhmut, rather than using strategic depth and mobility. It is also not surprising that several sources indicate that the Americans have been pressuring Zelensky to give up these cities in the Donbass, as the chances of a successful future Ukrainian counteroffensive are dwindling by the day due to heavy losses.
Since the Russians shifted the center of gravity of the war to the Donbass, the Ukrainians have been losing nearly two battalions a day, which is about 800 men. Such losses are not sustainable in the longer term. Ukraine already has acute problems when it comes to manpower. Just after the Russian invasion, millions of Ukrainian men who were fit for military service fled to European countries. In addition, many Ukrainian men live in areas now under Russian control and thus cannot be recruited. Add to this the large losses of men, and it seems that at this rate, Ukraine's human resources will run out sooner than Russia runs short of artillery shells.
The Russians are making effective use of their artillery, which is the backbone of Russian strategy. Another pillar of Russian strategy is that they manage to keep their professional army intact after a year of war. When Russia withdrew its army after the first phase of the war, it deployed the bulk of its army sparingly. Except for a few elite Russian units such as Russian airborne forces and marines, the heavy fighting was mainly done by volunteers such as Chechens and Russian people’s militias from the Donbass and Luhansk regions. In addition to volunteers, Moscow also made frequent and successful use of so-called Wagner mercenaries. Meanwhile, mobilized reservists could be trained and gain combat experience on the calmer parts of the front.
In contrast, Ukraine not only lost many troops, but also its most qualitative units. Currently, Ukrainian soldiers receive only a few weeks of NATO training, indicating that the losses on the Ukrainian side are immense. The desperation is also evident from images where men are forcibly recruited on the streets, because volunteers have simply run out. Not only these harsh methods of recruitment, but also the fact that boys as young as 18 and men over 60 are showing up at the front is a sign that Ukraine is scraping the barrel for soldiers. Should the Russian military leadership decide to deploy its professional army, the question is whether the depleted Ukrainian army will be able to defend itself as effectively as it did at the beginning of the war.
The Russians have turned the war from a quick war with small units, which NATO prefers, into a long-term war of attrition. This leads to great losses on the Ukrainian side. What has kept Ukraine going so far are western arms supplies. However, NATO prepared poorly for a war of attrition. In time, this will prove to be Ukraine’s downfall. Wars are not won by heroism and commitment. No matter how western media tries to extoll Ukraine’s commitment and capabilities. Wars are often won by the side with the largest arms stockpiles and production capacity, and the largest manpower pool. In World War II, the unbeatable German army was eventually defeated by the Allies' greater war industry and firepower and greater manpower potential. The Germans were effectively outgunned.
Despite the fact that mainly western media cried for months that the Russians would soon run short of artillery ammunition, it is NATO itself that has to deal with empty warehouses. NATO, meanwhile, has desperately requested countries such as South Korea, Brazil and Pakistan to supply artillery ammunition to Ukraine. One would expect that the mighty NATO would not need to approach other countries for ammunition supplies, given that NATO has a large arms industry.
The Russians still fire 5 times more artillery shells daily than the Ukrainians. Given the dire shortages and because many countries have not responded to the NATO request to supply artillery shells to Ukraine, the only salvation for Ukraine would be if NATO dramatically increases its production. Ukraine has indicated they need 250,000 artillery shells per month. The U.S. can produce 20,000 artillery shells in the short term and only as early as in 2025, they would be able to increase production capacity towards 90,000 per month. Europe does not produce more than that, they currently produce per month what Ukraine expends on a daily basis. The EU has plans to increase production, but they are not expected to be able to produce more than the Americans. It will take at least two years for NATO to get close to the 250,000 shells Ukraine needs. Time seems to be the enemy of Ukraine in this war of attrition.
Shortages are the recurring theme when it comes to the Ukrainian military. Besides ammunition, there is also a shortage of tanks. According to the British think tank IISS, Ukraine had 987 tanks before the war and NATO has supplied about 450 refurbished Soviet tanks since the invasion. Apparently, Russia has destroyed so many Ukrainian tanks that Zelensky has urged countries like Germany to supply the Leopard 2. So NATO is now forced to get its premium tanks from its own stockpile, which is proving problematic. On paper, NATO has enough tanks, but the reality is different. A significant portion of NATO's stockpiles consist of models such as the Leopard 1 A5. This type was produced in the 1980s and is no match against more modern Russian tanks. The tank has abysmal protection because of thin armor. Also, it has an inferior 105mm gun. Nevertheless, the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany want to jointly supply outdated 178 Leopard 1 tanks to Ukraine.
When it comes to the modern variant of this type, the Leopard 2 tank, NATO runs into other problems. Germany owns about 300 Leopard 2 tanks. 300 tanks is not a lot to defend a country like Germany, a consideration that, obviously, is also made in Berlin. Especially not if only 30% of these tanks are combat ready, according to Colonel Andre Wustner, head of the German military union. Other (future) NATO countries are not at all comfortable with supplying tanks, like Finland, which shares a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia and has to defend it with 239 main battle tanks. Even a country like Greece, suspicious of its Turkish neighbor, does not want to supply Leopard 2 tanks so far.
So the fact that NATO is only going to supply dozens of Leopard 2 tanks is not surprising. It shows that different NATO countries are mindful of their own security. Moreover, many tanks are not battle ready and take years to months to get them battle ready. The German war industry also cannot reduce this shortage of tanks with their production. In the coming years, the German industry is able to produce a maximum of three Leopards 2 tanks per month.
That the Russians will eventually win the war is inevitable. The Ukrainian army leadership finds itself in a very difficult position. They also know that wars are won by sufficient ammunition and military equipment, and an army has an inflection point when manpower losses become too great. The western and Ukrainian media gloss over the harsh reality. The Russians capitalized on NATO's weakness because they were not prepared for a prolonged bloody conflict. Western arms supplies will dry up regardless. In fact, it is Zelensky's utopia to think that the dozens of modern tanks NATO can provide will have an impact on the course of the war.
A painful observation is that Ukraine is suffering huge unnecessary losses, by frantically holding on to areas in the face of a Russian preponderance of artillery shells. Therefore, it will not be long before the West will try to avoid losing face. By the day, Zelensky's negotiating position grows weaker, due to NATO's dire shortfalls. For example, Macron and Scholz are said to have already discussed with Zelensky that he should negotiate peace with the Russians if the Ukrainians have not made significant progress on the battlefield by fall. According to Zelensky, Macron went even further, talking about a peace deal in exchange for ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia.
The West knows it has done the maximum for Ukraine. This war may continue for years to come, a price Russia is willing to pay. Ukraine is a matter of vital importance to Russia which cannot be said for the West. The West has deep pockets when it comes to financial support, but that too is exhaustive. Western governments are seeing declining support from their citizens when it comes to supporting Ukraine. According to an IPSOS survey, support among the population in the US and Germany, key donors of military aid to Ukraine, is seriously declining. Keeping Ukraine financially afloat will become a political challenge for Western governments. Ultimately, the West will have to face reality, and are forced to convince Ukraine of this as well. Poor preparation for a prolonged war, a financially expensive war and the prospect of having to financially support the reconstruction of a destroyed country, undeniably leads to an enforced exit strategy. Without the essential support of the West, both financial and moral, Ukraine will lose the war.